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Introduction
This paper considers potential spatial impacts of the Turning Points across the three
regions of The Northern Way: put simply, which types of areas are likely to be resilient
to the changes and perhaps even prosper, and which types of area might suffer? 
Strong arguments have been made for a range of consequences in much of northern
England of the various turning point “drivers” of change. It is worth noting that there
are also three global threats on the horizon – shortages of food, water and energy – that
have been characterised as threatening a “perfect storm” of mutually reinforcing
international crises. A reasonable response to this catalogue of seismic shifts to the status
quo is that any predictions of their combined impact must be very cautious. Even greater
hesitancy is sensible for predictions at the sub-regional scale1 of most interest here.
The next section of the paper sets out the approach taken in this paper to make the
diversity at the sub-regional scale manageable by developing a typology of places. The
following section then works through the turning points one by one, considering their
potential impacts on the types of place within the North that have been identified. A
concluding section then pulls together the implications identified to address the question
set at the start of this paper by taking each of the area types in turn.
Places in the North of England
There is substantial diversity among places at the sub-regional scale in northern England
that are facing the impacts of the turning points and the changes they may bring about.
One perspective of geographers is that each place is unique, not least because each has a
distinctive history of development. This history has not only shaped its present
characteristics but continues to affect how it responds to change. One interpretation of
this idea is the notion of path dependence (Simmie et al, 2008). For this paper, the
implication is that a long-term perspective is crucial: how places will respond to new
changes will be partly shaped by deep-seated features that have differentiated them from
other areas over a long period. 
A more prosaic way in which each place is unique is that each is in a unique location.
This observation becomes more significant when put in a relational perspective, because
it draws attention to the distinctive set of opportunities and constraints arising in any
location. A simplistic example here is that the situation and prospects of the Bootle in
inner Merseyside are profoundly different from those of another Bootle that is in a
remote part of the Lake District. This paper reflects some of these locational aspects of
place uniqueness, along with a focus on long-term relationships between areas that have
shaped the prospects for different places over decades.
Rooting the discussion below in locational and other long-term distinctions between
areas can exacerbate the scale of challenge presented by the uniqueness of places. Two
initial steps make the challenge manageable. The first is to emphasise that, whilst each
place is in an absolute sense unique, it is conventionally accepted that places are
groupable into types that broadly share key characteristics. For example, the categories
urban and rural are certainly “fuzzy” – and each includes places which are hugely varied
– but the two types are sufficiently distinct from each other for them to usually merit
differing strands of research and policy. As a result, this part of the paper develops an
appropriate typology of places for the following discussion of the turning points and
their impact on different places in the North.
The other step needed is to resolve the question of the scale of place in the typology.
Given the long-term nature of the changes envisaged, spatial impacts will not remain
1
By way of comparison, weather forecasts
from the Met Office are only made available
for small areas for a short period ahead (ie.
when uncertainty over the processes is least):
the further ahead, and hence the more
uncertain the forecast, the larger the area it is
made available for. 
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constrained within very localised areas but will have feedback and spillover effects via
externalities and adjustment processes. Many of the turning points bear upon the
economic prospects for areas and this suggests that sub-regional economic areas are the
scale of most interest here. New policy regimes such as those enacted in the Local
Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act emphasise analysis at this
scale in relation to the economic and “place” policy agendas. No single agreed set of
areas exists at this scale, but the most frequently cited template is that offered by Travel-
to-Work Areas and so it is this set of areas which is discussed here.
One consequence here of analysing at the sub-regional scale is that the distinction
between urban and rural can be appropriately specified: areas in the countryside that are
intimately linked with nearby substantial urban areas must be viewed as inherent to
those urban sub-regions (eg. North Yorkshire areas near Middlesbrough are part of the
Teesside area in relation to the issues discussed here). This means that the term rural is
used here for sub-regions like Kendal where the key drivers are largely independent of
larger urban areas for everyday purposes. The second consequence of looking at the
sub-regional scale is that the paper cannot engage with the locality and neighbourhood
scale issues centred on the built environment, for example.
The discussion so far has set out three starting points for developing a typology.
1. There needs to be an emphasis on long-term differentials between places.
2. The relationship between places is an important continuing factor in play.
3. There is a distinction2 between rural (as defined here) and more urban areas.
These three dimensions shape the typology devised below.
The strength of a long-term perspective can be illustrated here with a brief look at the
early application of computing in geography by Moser and Scott (1961). Larger towns
were classified based on 1951 Population Census data using principal component and
cluster analysis. Principal Component I was the key influence on the findings. With its
focus on education qualifications and related socio-economic differentials, Principal
Component I can now be termed a measure of human capital. This clearly foreshadows
many subsequent analyses of the economic prospects for areas which have put human
capital in the foreground (eg. OECD, 2009a). 
Moser and Scott (op cit) developed a classification of the towns from this analysis.
Looking at the town groups with at least three towns either in the North or in the South
and Midlands, there were four whose mean Principal Component I scores were near or
above the national average: these four groups included just five northern towns between
them, but 36 towns in the South or Midlands. In contrast, the five town groups with
Principal Component I scores – that is, levels of human capital – that fell distinctly below
average included 42 northern towns, whereas only 18 were found in the South or
Midlands. The group with the lowest average human capital scores was the Mining town
group; this highlights the more general fact that what had been observed by analysing
data for 1951 proved to be indicating a crucial and long-lasting differential between
places. The lagging level of qualifications and skills in many parts of the North remained
prominent in policy throughout much of the half-century since the Census of 1951 and,
of course, remains highly relevant in the diverging prospects of places. 
For these reasons, qualification levels are taken here as a key indicator to use as the
longer-term differential between places shaping their growth dynamics. Of course, the
other key factors for the typology – relative location and urban-rural contrast – persist
through time, too. For example, the contrast in level of urbanisation between the more
rural north and more urban west of Yorkshire remains despite the gradual shift in
population within the North of England towards its smaller settlements (see, for example,
2
OECD actually deem no part of the North to
be a predominantly rural region, according to
their typology that uses criteria developed to
be as internationally comparable as possible
(OECD 2009b).
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3
Note that this differs from an oft-cited “city-
region” idea in which the region around the
city essentially services the city (eg. by
providing commuters): although there is a
symbiotic relationship between the
constituent parts of a region, the view taken
here is that the more fundamental aspect is
the services that the city provides to its region
(with a parallel drawn to the creation of
county towns to provide central functions for
counties, rather than the counties being
secondary to the county towns).
Figure 3.4 in Parkinson et al, 2006). This is not to say all settlements below some size
level have grown; former industrial and coalfield villages continue to belie such a
generalisation. Even so, a broad contrast between areas in terms of their settlement size
remains relevant here, although the category “urban” is clearly too large to be much
value.
Parkinson et al (op cit) point to the distinctive role played by dominant regional centres
in recent research and policy. This distinctive role means that it is appropriate for one of
the place types being identified here to be the Core Cities in the North (Leeds;
Liverpool; Manchester; Newcastle; Sheffield). As in any typology, of course, this does
not imply that all members of a group are entirely similar. For example, there is a wide
recognition that for a long time Liverpool suffered more severe decline than most other
British large cities. One characteristic which these cities do definitely share is their
provision of higher-order services for large populous surrounding areas. As key regional
cities3 they service their regions; they have been doing this for a long period, and this
role seems certain to be integral to their future. 
The remaining urban areas are a very heterogeneous group, ranging in size from larger
cities like Hull to smaller towns like the Cumbrian urban areas. At this point, the
emphasis above on the largest cities servicing a wider area can provide a new but
important way of separating some of these urban areas into a second type here. This
shifts attention to the second factor in the typology, which can be seen to take on board
the “relational” emphasis within European spatial planning (Healey, 2004). 
One corollary of the Core Cities providing services to a wider area than their own
immediate surroundings is that some urban areas are over-shadowed by other, probably
larger, nearby centres. An area over-shadowed by others can be identified by analysing
commuting flows between areas, but the fact areas like Macclesfield have strong
commuting flows with Manchester does not itself mean that such a town is either
advantaged or disadvantaged by that relationship (cf. Lucci and Hildreth, 2008). A more
subtle view is that the impact of the relationship depends on the distinct roles each place
plays in their region. The following brief analysis applies the emphasis here on long-term
dynamics in a distinctive but relevant way.
Carruthers (1967) conducted an ambitious analysis of 1961 Census of Distribution data
for retail centres, setting standards for much work to follow. One of the less celebrated
elements of this analysis was the identification of centres whose scale suggested a
restricted attraction of shoppers from outlying areas. These centres were interpreted as
having very constrained catchment areas, associated with the proximity of larger centres
nearby. 
Table 1 shows constrained centres existing across much of the shopping hierarchy. For
example, Bradford is a constrained centre which had the same high score (20) that
applied to Hull which is not constrained. (Other comparator pairs of constrained and
unconstrained centres range from Bolton and Preston among the larger centres down to
Castleford and Bishop Auckland at the smaller end of the ranking.) Table 1 provides a
comparison of the Carruthers 1961-based scores with the retail floorspace data from
2004 for the same shopping centres. The two datasets do not measure retail centre size in
exactly the same way, but an average ratio, calculated for all the northern centres
together, provides a base against which to compare the same ratio for any individual
centre. Thus the value of 117.2 for the constrained centres with a score of 20 on 1961
data shows their retail centre size increase in the 1961-2004 period was 17% more than
the size increase of all northern centres taken together.
Table 1 may exaggerate how much more quickly larger centres grew when compared to
the smaller ones, but the analysis is fully robust when comparing centres with similar
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initial scores. Thus what are crucial here are comparisons made horizontally (not
vertically). Table 1 then makes it very clear that the constrained centres have consistently
grown more slowly than centres of equivalent size in 1961. The clear conclusion is that
there was a growth “penalty” of being a constrained centre which has persisted strongly
over the latter part of the 20th century. 
Table 1: Standardised ratio of 2004 to 1961 size measures of northern retail centres
score* (1961) constrained not constrained
24 [none in north] 209.6
23 [none in north] [none in north]
22 [none in north] 196.7
21 [none in north] [none in north]
20 117.2 160.2
19 91.5 106.1
18 93.6 108.0
17 81.6 101.7
16 65.6 94.7
15 60.8 100.2
14 66.5 111.5
13 46.8 56.5
* score on the provision of selected shopping facilities
The reason that constrained centres slipped further behind their stronger neighbours
over recent years is not difficult to find. The profit motive makes retailers service
populations in as low-cost a way as possible, and this will lead them to serve the same
population from one location rather than two where possible. As people have become
more mobile (Schäfer et al, 2009) two towns – which of course remain the same distance
apart – gradually become more readily served from a sole site. If one of the towns was
already over-shadowed by the other, so that on 1961 data it could already be identified
as having only a constrained role, it is unsurprising if that town saw successive retailers
concentrating on the stronger centre nearby. Recently some such towns have become
termed “under-served markets” (Claxton and Siora, 2009). The key process here is a
growth of longer-distance linkages and the consequence, as observed in very many
urban and regional circumstances, is that increasing flows between two areas tend to
bring net benefits to the stronger area.
Some evidence to support the argument that there are more general disadvantages in
being a constrained town can be seen from linking this analysis to Hall et al (2001) who
separated retail hierarchy issues from other key aspects of urban status based on major
service facilities. This hierarchy defined on criteria other than retail status shows that
from 1965 to 1998 virtually half (48%) of the constrained northern towns that they
analysed fell to a lower rung in the national urban hierarchy – in fact 12% fell by two
rungs – whereas just a third of the other northern centres fell by one rung, and only 3%
by two rungs. This confirms that the over-shadowing effect observed from the retailing
data was associated with a broader pattern leading to an increasing loss of services.
Services play such a dominant role within modern economies that such a sustained loss
of service activity to a stronger nearby centre will be a critical weakness for over-
shadowed towns, both directly in lost potential job growth but also indirectly through
the key role of service facilities in making places more attractive.
The arguments here have led to looking at rural and urban areas separately and, among
the urban areas, separating out the Core Cities and the constrained towns, which are
located near Core Cities in practice. This leaves the remaining categories “other urban”
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and rural which now need to be considered further. As for rural areas, Lowe and Ward
(2009) identify a continuum with genuinely separate rural places at one end and, at the
other end, “rurbs” that are really just “socio-economically extensions of urban
agglomerations” (p.1330). For this paper these parts of the countryside that are closely
integrated with urban areas have already been grouped with those urban areas as a
result of the decision to analyse at the sub-regional scale: this means that “rurbs” need
not be treated separately here. Hence the category “rural” here will only include areas
remaining largely separate from urban areas; they tend to be more peripherally located
and most are in or near National Parks in fact. 
The final issue to be dealt with is the “other” urban areas: those which are neither Core
Cities nor constrained by a dominant neighbouring area. Coombes et al (1979) used the
term “free-standing” for this type of area, but it was also recognised that they form a
very heterogeneous group of places. Recalling the first starting point for the typology, it
is appropriate to divide this residual category according to their levels of human capital.
In practice then, the set of “other” urban areas have been divided according to whether
the proportion of their 2007 working age populations who are qualified at NVQ4 or
above was more than national average. For simplicity, the two categories are referred to
below as the Higher-Skill Towns and Lower-Skill Towns: Table 2 gives an example, from
each of the three northern regions, of the five types of area now identified as appropriate
for the discussion in the rest of this paper.
Table 2: A classification of areas in northern England: examples from each region
Area Type North West Yorkshire & Humber North East
Core Cities Manchester Sheffield Newcastle 
Constrained Urban Blackburn Huddersfield Sunderland
Higher-Skill Towns Chester York Darlington
Lower-Skill Towns Blackpool Scunthorpe Teesside
Rural Areas Penrith Richmond Berwick
Turning points within the North
This is the key section of the paper which reflects on the implications of the turning
points discussed by earlier papers for each of the five types of area in the North. 
It is appropriate to consider aspects of technological change first, because all past
evidence indicates that this is one form of change which will occur regardless of any
other shifts in economy or society. Perry (2010) identifies the North as rather badly
placed to benefit directly from technological advances because it lags behind the South in
the endowment of knowledge-intensive sectors and also in patenting rates. One or two of
the Core Cities and the Higher-Skill Towns are more favoured, largely due to the
presence of strong universities, but they are the exceptions even within these area types.
The least likely to benefit from such developments are the Lower-Skill Towns because
their labour forces will not attract employers in new technology sectors.
On the more specific issue of information technology, Richardson and Tranos (2010)
emphasise the urban-centric nature of the vital supporting infrastructure. Clearly this
means the Core Cities are likely to be the favoured area type in the North, and some of
the Constrained Urban towns may benefit from being close to these major centres. Rural
Areas were seen to be particularly threatened by a possible widening of the digital divide.
In terms of the second-order impacts, Richardson and Tranos (op cit) emphasised that
firms make productivity gains from exploiting newly available technology by being
adaptable: this flexibility is probably more difficult for branch plants than for
independent firms. Employment in many northern areas is dominated by branch plants,
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particularly areas that have had a sustained period of regional policy assistance (which
includes a large proportion of the areas in the categories Constrained Urban and Lower-
Skill Towns). A final point here is that advanced information and communication
technology could cause substantial job displacement in some more basic information
processing sectors. Contact centres have already seen this occur with the off-shoring of
some work that had begun to look like a major growth opportunity for many larger
urban areas of the North. 
Taken together, the set of points on technological change reviewed here come to the not
greatly surprising conclusion that existing differentials – which have of course been
partly created by earlier versions of such technological changes – seem likely to be
reinforced. A few factors such as infrastructure provision could favour the conurbations
but it is unclear whether they have the other assets needed to benefit from this potential
advantage. The areas with most relevant assets and few definite obstacles to reaping
benefits are the Higher-Skill Towns: that said, the broader picture seems likely to be a
further widening of the gap between north and south due to the unique role of London
and its wider region in technology-enabled economic growth.
Globalisation is enabled by advances in information and communication technology,
and its continuation is almost as certain as is further technological development.
Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2010) outline its key dynamics and the selective nature of
its spatial impacts, revealing clear echoes of the summary above of which northern areas
may be most affected by technology development. The areas expected to gain most from
intensifying global trade patterns have strong human capital shown by skill and
entrepreneurship levels – favouring Higher-Skill Towns – whilst the importance of
infrastructure may favour the largest urban centres. 
Another factor that tends to enable areas to have a positive response to globalisation is
strong local and/or regional governance. Strength here means not only cohesive but also
relatively powerful. Cohesive governance at sub-national level has long been lacking in
England and as yet there is only just a possibility that a turning point may have been
reached in those parts of the North such as Greater Manchester where the new
opportunity to create multi-area agreements is being trialled. This is a long way from the
sort of arrangements developed over many years now in some metropolitan regions
elsewhere in Europe (Cadell et al 2008). Probably even worse than the lack of
cohesiveness is the relative powerlessness of English local government. In this context
what is meant by power is what Rodríguez-Pose (2009) identifies as key: freedom and
resources to pursue distinctive policies suited to the local situation. Instead it seems – as
discussed below – more likely that central government will further constrain local
government in order to cut public spending. The spatial impacts within the North are
likely to include large urban areas losing the opportunity to gain from globalisation due
largely to cuts in public spending on infrastructure.
Central government in Britain needing to cut public spending was a key consequence of
the global financial crisis identified by Tomaney (2010). The less prosperous parts of the
North that predominate in the conurbations and Lower-Skill Towns have previously
been major beneficiaries of public spending and thus are at the greatest risk of suffering
from this change. In particular, Core Cities have gained from growth in public funding,
especially through its underpinning of regeneration achieved via land and property
development. Investment by the private sector has been severely choked off and is
expected to be very cautious in returning, to housing development most especially. This
will work itself out spatially with the longest delays to renewed investment affecting the
least “prime” areas of the North viz: the poorest areas. At the same time, the initially
anticipated direct impact of the financial crisis – the greatest job losses being in the
financial sector which tends to be heavily represented in the more affluent areas – has
not materialised in practice. In summary, the spatial impact within the North of the
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global financial crisis seems likely to be a widening of the gulf between the more
prosperous Higher-Skill Towns (together with many Rural Areas) as against the most
acutely affected disadvantaged areas that include most other urban areas. 
Public finance also loomed large in the discussions of the impacts of demographic
change by Boden and Rees (2010). There is pressure for public spending increases due
to the needs of a growing population of the very old. Setting aside the possibility of a
substantial rise in the employment rate of those who are younger (in part through raising
the pensionable age), the need to increase the numbers paying taxes as well as to
maintain the labour force generally calls for a larger young migrant net inflow. How
likely this will be must partly depend on just how the global financial crisis plays out in
future years across different countries. 
Within the North, Boden and Rees (op cit) emphasise that Rural Areas are where the
current dynamics of natural change and selective migration are producing the most acute
ageing trends. Although the fiscal problems referred to above are at present not localised
– because central government funds most health and care provision directly or indirectly
– this might change as part of a strategy to cut public spending. As for the foreseen need
for higher net in-migration flows, here too earlier research suggests that future patterns
build on the imprint of the past. Flows of new migrants have a tendency to go, at least
initially, to areas where there are earlier migrants from the same part of the world: this
was even true of the seemingly unprecedented inflow of central and eastern European
migrants following the expansion of the European Union in 2004 (Coombes et al, 2007).
It seems likely that the consequence will be a further differentiation between the more
ethnically diverse large urban areas and the smaller towns and rural parts of the North.
Boden and Rees (op cit) show that increased public funding need is associated with
ethnic diversity due to higher birth rates and greater probability of deprivation. This risk
would be widespread across the Core Cities and Constrained Urban areas, with some
Lower-Skill Towns also at risk.
Gibbs (2010) suggests that most of the North face few immediate challenges from
climate change. That said, some low-lying eastern areas are prone to suffer in the longer
term from rising sea levels, while drier summers will affect some agriculture. These
effects mostly impact on selected Rural Areas and, in general, the selectivity of potential
impacts is highlighted on the positive side, too. Opportunities to gain from any “green
new deal” may depend on existing skills and sectors that currently are minor parts of the
economic landscape in any part of the North. Gibbs (op cit) sees a more indirect
employment creation opportunity in the need to greatly improve the energy efficiency of
the housing stock, but this may well be stalled by public spending constraints. 
A more fundamental response to climate change would be a radical reversal of the long-
term growth in personal mobility (Schäfer et al, 2009). This scenario sees local areas
once again being largely self-contained in that they provide their populations with a large
share of their employment and service needs, so reducing the need to travel. The
negative impact would be on Core Cities which would lose incoming service users,
whilst the Constrained Urban category could be among the greatest gainers due to
creating and retaining more local income streams. Lowe and Ward (op cit) set out this
scenario of greater self-containment in Rural Areas as one end of a spectrum of
possibilities. Of all the speculations discussed so far, this may be the clearest turning
point of all: to reverse the trend to greater interaction between areas – intimately linked
with urbanisation among other basic processes (Storper, 2009) – would be a seismic shift
that seems unlikely given the arguments here about inertia and path dependency.
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Conclusion
This final section of the paper pulls together, for each area type in turn, the various
points made in the discussions above of the spatial implications of the turning points. 
Core Cities are possibly the most distinctive area type, although this is not to ignore
notable contrasts among the five northern Core Cities which range from the steady
“success story” of Leeds to the well-known difficulties found in most of the others.
Beyond these generalisations there are also the strong inequalities which are found
within any large city, which even Leeds is fully subject to (Stillwell and Shepherd, 2004).
Both globalisation patterns and possible differentiation by level of telecommunication
infrastructure were seen to give Core Cities some economic potential absent in other
parts of the North. Yet the key here is the word “potential” which shifts attention to the
importance of high-level human capital and associated outcomes such as the level of
entrepreneurship. The strong contingency associated with the prospects for large cities is
shown by Champion and Townsend (2009) because the “long boom” in fact produced
very uneven growth rates. The wide socio-economic divides in Core Cities can lead
them to rely on a small, highly talented group within their potential workforce who may
seize the new opportunities. Not only is this group rather small in these cities it can also
be highly mobile (Champion et al, 2007), which leads to the recent policy emphasis on
attracting and retaining talented individuals. 
Part of the policy response in the Core Cities has been major physical regeneration,
especially of the city centre where there has also been provision of new-style housing for
young professionals: one effect of the financial crisis is expected to be a virtual stand-still
of such development by both public and private sectors. At the opposite end of the social
spectrum, the wide divide within Core Cities means they also include major
concentrations of deprivation and – so far as these are associated with the presence of
ethnic minority groups – then the anticipated rise in net international in-migration may
lead to a growing need for public spending at a time of public expenditure restraint. One
of the few growth mechanisms that the largest cities could rely on in the past has been
the increasing concentration of higher order services there. If there were radical
reductions in personal mobility as a way of limiting climate change then this Core Cities
growth motor would go into reverse.
The other side of the same coin is that this, admittedly unlikely, prospect of radically
reduced personal mobility would see Constrained Urban areas benefit. Their very
definition here was based on them seeing a large – and growing – loss to their local
services by people travelling further to larger cities instead. The proximity of the larger
cities may bring some benefits to the Constrained Urban areas, though, if the wider
urban regions exploit advantages such as superior infrastructure provision. More
generally, these advantages are identified as agglomeration economies (Rodríguez-Pose
and Tijmstra op cit) but these are no guarantee of economic growth. In fact the evidence
of several recent decades in the North is that its conurbations have only very rarely seen
growth rates above the national average. Worse still, it is likely that the Constrained
Urban areas tend to rely on “trickle down” growth from the Core Cities in particular, so
unless they create unprecedented levels of growth it is difficult to see prosperity
spreading across whole conurbations. If areas like Hackney failed to share in the very
rapid growth that occurred a few kilometres away in the City of London and Docklands
then just how rapidly would Leeds have to grow to provide prosperity for a city region
that extends to Halifax 20 kilometres away?
The emphasis on potential “spillover” economic growth here is not misplaced because
the indigenous growth prospects of Constrained Urban areas are weak. They are
typified by low levels of human capital and a high dependence on branch plants,
exacerbated now by an off-shoring risk to the recent growth in contact centre or data
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processing work. The implications of economic decline could be greater when less public
finance is available for the unemployment-related transfer payments many of these areas
already rely relatively heavily upon. More pessimistic prospects could include a loss of
social cohesion if resentment at economic distress gets diverted into hostility over
growing ethnic diversity.
Very similar challenges face many of the numerous Lower-Skill Towns of the North,
although not all have the same high levels of ethnic diversity. Whilst they share most of
the problems that Constrained Urban areas are presented with, they do not share all the
potential advantages enjoyed by the latter type of area. The key differences stem from
location. As explained above, being close to a larger centre through being part of a wider
conurbation may bring growth diffused outwards from the larger city. By contrast,
Lower-Skill Towns are more free-standing and so more reliant on growth which they
have fostered internally. By the same token, if they do succeed in creating growth
internally then it is less likely to be diffused to other areas than would be the case for an
area with intensive interactions with near neighbours. Pike et al (2006) reviewed the
benefits and disadvantages of being a more self-contained area and concluded that in
itself it is broadly neutral in its impact, although areas that are more self-contained may
be prone to more extreme peaks and troughs because of their more limited interaction
with other areas. 
This relatively high self-containment – with its attendant risks and potential rewards – is
shared by the Higher-Skill Towns as identified here. Their definitive characteristic of
relatively high-level human capital may make these areas attractive to potential inward
investors in high value-added sectors that can exploit new technologies and, as these
towns tend not to be in more remote coastal locations, so may gain access to improved
infrastructure quite soon after a roll-out has reached a Core City (eg. North Cheshire
gaining from its proximity to the conurbations of the North West). Another aspect of
higher level human capital is that it is associated with stronger potential for
entrepreneurship, so these areas also have more prospects for indigenously derived
growth. It is important here to ask why certain areas have become Higher-Skill Towns
when others have not. Common factors, found in different combinations among these
modestly sized towns or cities, include the presence of a university for at least 30 years,
location on main national transport routes, and attractive urban fabric. This is relevant
because such attributes do not change quickly, so the attractivity (Fotheringham et al
2000) of the areas to more mobile talented people may persist too. This suggests the
Higher-Skill Towns are likely to continue renewing their human capital advantage over
most other areas.
Although the land-based sectors now employ just a small proportion of the population in
northern Rural Areas, they are notable here in that agriculture may be the northern
industry most directly susceptible to climate change. That said, adaptation has been a
key to the economic survival of farming for many years past. Some remoter areas have
reduced their relative peripherality by utilising the internet in a range of ways, but as
expectations of very high-level broadband provision rise they may be on the wrong side
of a digital divide because it will not be profitable for providers to supply the highest
grade infrastructure to small and/or distant settlements. A more social aspect of the
digital divide exists between younger and older people: this is relevant here, too, because
Rural Areas are on track to be the first parts of the North where the very old become a
substantial proportion of the population. This is one way in which many rural
communities are increasingly dependent on urban areas: they need the care and health
facilities that are more efficiently located there. To date it has also been feasible for rather
younger people to move to more rural locations and then commute to work in urban
areas (cf. Champion et al, 2009). This behaviour may become less plausible as policy
develops to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, at this point the discussion may
have strayed too far into pure speculation, perhaps attracted by the self-contained Rural
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Areas scenario of Lowe and Ward (op cit) which may have much to recommend it, but
cannot easily be seen as a likely future. Militating against such radical changes are the
deeply-rooted trends that have been emphasised here as a crucial part of grounding
speculations on turning points in the reality of the highly persistent contrasts between
the differing parts of the North.
To summarise: the spatial implications of the turning points mostly reinforce existing
differentials such as that between Core Cities and Constrained Urban areas nearby, and
between the Higher-Skill Towns and the Lower-Skill Towns in much of the North. Yet
the notion of turning points prompts speculation about transformative change: could
there not be such major changes that large numbers of areas shift from one type to
another, or even that the typology might become out-moded? One example of such a
transformative change in settlement patterns was provided in the last century by the
New Towns policy which created several substantial northern towns, some times on
“green field” sites to all intents and purposes. For the foreseeable future the constraints
on public expenditure seem to rule out a revival of any such policy which was
exceptional in its scale, and even the far more modest policy innovations such as growth
points may have to be restricted.
Another form of unprecedented change that may occur is by the emergence of some
exceptionally favoured area whose assets are crucial to a new development process. The
problem here, of course, is that it is usually only in retrospect that research can identify
the key advantage underpinning rapid prosperity growth in that one area. For example,
research on the “Cambridge phenomenon” sought to explain a pattern which had
already emerged: there was no prior prediction this pattern would emerge (Wicksteed,
2000). Even so, the exceptional assets of Cambridge might have been identified before
the growth took place, given that Cambridge houses one of the strongest concentrations
of scientific knowledge in the world. It is difficult to identify parts of the North that will
feature in relevant global “top ten” lists of cities or regions. The more positive side of the
same coin is that few if any parts of the North are likely to feature in global “bottom ten”
lists either. The North of England does not include places that are, for example, among
the most endangered by flooding from rising sea levels or shrinking fresh water supplies.
The possible candidates for inclusion in such lists of threatened areas may be heavy
process centres like Teesside that may face radical change as part of the need to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Thus the tentative conclusion is that transformative change to the settlement pattern of
the North is unlikely. The arguments here have emphasised continuity in many
differentials between places, and the review of turning points tended to find reasons for
these differentials being reinforced rather than eroded. Put another way, it seems
unlikely that there will be fundamental shifts to the balance between the attractions and
disadvantages of different types of place that persistently shape the location choices of
economic activity and talented people (cf. Boschma and Fritsch, 2009). 
12 TURNING POINTS 
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